In this paper we examine how board structure affects the informativeness of board members by comparing the returns earned by officers and independent directors from purchasing the firm's stock. We investigate whether an exogenous shock to the board structure -the 2002 SarbanesOxley Act and the related mandates -leads to a shift in information asymmetry between officers and independent directors. We find that improvement in board's information environment is limited to firms whose boards are previously controlled by outsiders. In contrast, information asymmetry rises among firms whose boards are previously dominated by insiders: An increase in independent directors is followed by a significantly larger difference in buy-and-hold returns between officers and independent directors. In addition, the deterioration in board's information environment is associated with a poor firm operating performance.
INTRODUCTION
A well-functioning corporate board is an indication of the overall effectiveness of corporate governance system. In the wake of recent corporate scandals, a prevailing view among regulators and practitioners is that it is in the interest of shareholders to have the majority of board members to be independent directors ("outsiders"), who have no business or employment relations with the firm and therefore, are most effective in monitoring managers.
1 Consequently, better governance is often identified with more independent board directors.
However, an emerging literature argues that the composition of corporate board is likely to be endogenous (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 and 1998; Harris and Raviv, 2006) . In particular, while an outsider-dominated board alleviates the agency problem between managers and shareholders, an insider-controlled board improves the efficiency of board decisions by better exploiting insider information (Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferria, 2007) . Since board decisions are based on information available to its members, a deteriorating interaction between management and board members may inevitably lead to a decrease in the efficiency of board monitoring. Contrary to the popular view, these studies indicate that governance is not "one-sizefits-all".
In this paper we examine how board structure affects the informativeness of independent directors. To address the issue of endogeneity, we use an exogenous shock -the 2002 SarbanesOxley Act and the related mandates -to identify a shift in board compositions. 2 Specifically, we concentrate on the most prominent feature of board structure -the degree of board independence 1 Independent director is defined as a person "other than an executive officer or employee of the company or any other individual having a relationship which, in the opinion of the issuer's board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director" (see Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2008 for a detailed discussion of definitions of independent directors). For advocates for more board independence, see The Business Roundtable (1997) , National Association of Corporate Directors (2001) , and Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc., (2003) . In fact, Gordon (2007) documents a dramatic shift towards independent directors within the composition of large public company boards -from approximately 20% independents to 75% independents -during the period of . The standards for independence also became increasingly rigorous over the period. See also Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2005) , and Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) for related discussions. In this paper we use "outside directors" and "independent directors" interchangeably. 2 Part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that the audit committee consist entirely of outside directors. Both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require listed firms to use a majority of independent directors on the board. The implementation of these regulations poses as an exogenous shock to board structure, as firms are forced to alter their board structures in compliance with these mandates.
measured by the proportion of independent directors on the board, and investigate whether a shift in board independence leads to a change in information asymmetry between firms' executives and independent directors.
We measure the informativeness of board members through their returns earned from trading the company's stock. Using data on board information and insider trading during the pre- We begin our analysis by comparing the returns earned by the two types of individuals for the overall sample. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects a series of legal attempts to improve corporate governance and information environment in the United States, we should expect a decline in information asymmetry within corporate board after the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates. Instead, we find that there is little change in information asymmetry during the sample period: Firm executives on average earn higher abnormal returns than independent directors over various investment horizons (one-, three-, six-, nine-and 12-months), both before the SOX and after the SOX.
Further analysis reveals that this lack of significant improvement in board's information environment is driven by firms whose boards are previously dominated by insiders. In fact, information asymmetry rises for these firms after the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates. While independent directors earn similar returns as officers for these firms during the pre-SOX period, they experience dramatically lower returns than officers post-SOX. For example, the cumulative abnormal return over a six-month buy-and-hold period for shares purchased by independent directors is 4.54% before the SOX, statistically and economically comparable to the 6.24% return earned by firm executives during the same period. In contrast, the return to the same independent directors averages 5.46% post-SOX, less than half of the 12.42% return earned by average corporate executives. Our results are robust after controlling for firm fixed-effects, firm size, earnings volatilities, market trading conditions, firms' growth opportunities, past stock returns and individual trader's holdings of the company's shares.
Post-SOX analyses for firms whose boards are previously dominated by insiders further confirm our main findings. In the first set of post-SOX analysis we compare between the returns earned by the existing independent directors and new independent directors of the same firm, proxied by those who initiate trades only during the post-SOX period. We find that new independent directors on average earn even lower returns than the existing independent directors.
This effect is especially pronounced over shorter investment horizons. This suggests an even higher degree of information asymmetry between officers and independent directors who join the board only post-SOX. In the second set of analysis we compare information asymmetry between firms that switched from a pre-SOX, below-50% level of board independence to a post-SOX, above-50% level of board independence, and firms that remain below the 50% threshold post SOX. We find that officers earn significantly higher returns than existing independent directors only for the former type of firms, not for the latter.
For firms whose boards are previously dominated by outside directors, however, the effect of SOX and the related mandates reverses. The difference in returns between officers and independent directors of these firms decreases from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX period.
In addition, there is no significant information asymmetry post-SOX, as neither do officers earn significantly higher returns than the existing independent directors, nor do the existing directors earn higher returns than new independent directors. These findings suggest that the improvement in information environment within corporate board is limited to firms whose boards already have a high level of outsider presence even before the SOX.
Our results are robust to a variety of alternative sample specifications and variable definitions. In particular, we observe similar findings when we classify our sample firms based on low, intermediate, and high level of board independence during the pre-SOX period.
Next, we explore the real effect of information asymmetry among board members in the context of operating performance. We find that during the pre-SOX period, there is no difference in industry-adjusted ROA, free cash flows and operating income between firms with insiderdominated boards and with outsider-dominated boards, after controlling for firm characteristics such as size, age, leverage, board size, the degree of board independence. During the post-SOX period, however, firms previously associated with insider-dominated boards experience a significantly poorer operating performance.
Our findings suggest that the effect of the SOX and the related mandates, implemented in an effort to promote better corporate governance and to improve information environment, is limited only to firms which are previously already associated with an outsider-dominated board.
In contrast, for firms previously associated with an insider-dominated board, information asymmetry between corporate executives and independent board members is negligible before the SOX, but increases significantly post-SOX. Furthermore, including more (new) independent directors -often enforced by the SOX and its related mandates -leads to an even more opaque information environment within the board, as information asymmetry between officers and new independent directors tends to be higher than that between officers and existing independent directors among these firms.
Our paper thus provides evidence in favor of Raheja (2005), Harris and Raviv (2006) and Adam and Ferreia (2007) that board composition is endogenously driven: Information asymmetry among board members becomes significant only after the SOX for firms whose board previously has less outsider presence. Our performance analysis further indicates that the information role of board members has a profound real effect, as an increase in information asymmetry within corporate board is associated with a deteriorating operating performance.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature analyzing board composition and firm performance. In particular, while Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), among others, find evidence that more independent boards are better board, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Klein (1998) find the fraction of insiders is positively related to firm performance. More recent studies document cross-sectional variation in determinants of board composition (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2005; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2007a and 2007b) and provide evidence in support that board structure is endogenously chosen (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 and 1998) . In addition, Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2002) , Bainbridge (2003) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) show that regulatory actions applying one-size-fits-all criteria can damage some firms.
Different from these studies, we take into account the potential endogeneity of board structure and concentrate on information asymmetry between firm executives and board members. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence through what mechanisms that board composition contributes to the efficiency of (or the lack thereof) board monitoring. In this respect, our paper is related to Ravina and Sapienza (2007) , who find that the difference between the returns earned by firm's executives and independent directors from trading the company's stock is relatively small at most of the horizons analyzed over the sample period of 1986-2003. Instead, we study the effect of board structure on the informativeness of board members as well as the effect of the board's information environment on firm's operating performance. We show that when explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of board structure, this result reversed for firms previously associated with an insider-dominated board, as information asymmetry within the board of these firms rises during the post-SOX period. In addition, our analysis indicates that information asymmetry between firm executives and independent directors is predominately driven by board composition, instead of pertinent to other corporate governance measures such as the G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) .
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the Sarbanes-Oxley act and the related mandates on board composition and a review of literature on corporate board compositions. Sections 3 and 4 describe the estimation strategy and data construction, respectively. Sections 5 and 6 report the empirical results. Section 7 conducts an analysis on firm's operating performance. Section 8 discusses various tests for robustness.
Section 9 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Related Mandates on Board Composition
Enacted as an emergency legislation amid high-profile corporate scandals, the Sarbanes- This movement toward specific board guidelines, typically calling for greater outside representation, is also a characteristic of the Codes of Best Practice issued in many countries (see Denis and McConnell, 2003) . As a result, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ amended their rules to require the boards of listed firms to have a majority of independent directors.
Literature on Corporate Board
Our paper is related to an emerging literature arguing that board structure is endogenously chosen (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 and 1998; Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2006; Adams and Ferreria, 2007) . Since board decisions are based on the information available to and provided by both insiders and outsiders, board composition shapes the information set of board members by affecting the strategic interaction between insiders and outsiders. In Adams and Ferreria (2007) , a higher level of board independence increases management's fear of losing control and private benefit, and consequently, leads to a great incentive to conceal information from outside board members. This in turn increases the information asymmetry between management and board members. Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2006) argue that insider-controlled boards can be optimal despite of the agency problems because such kind of boards better exploits insiders' information. Enforcing a higher level of outsiders on the board discourages insiders from completely revealing accurate information.
Therefore, unless boards are given better access to information, simply increasing board independence is not sufficient to improve governance.
Recent empirical evidence indicates that board composition is determined by the scope and complexity as well as information environment in which the firm operates (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao, 2004; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2005) . In particular, Boone, Field, Karpoll, and Raheja (2007) find that board size and composition vary across firms, and change over time, to accommodate the specific growth, monitoring and managerial characteristics of the firm. These findings preclude a universal effect of a higher level of board independence on firm performance.
More related to our paper, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) document that the stronger board independence requirements mandated in 2002 affected large firms positively but small firms negatively. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2007a and 2007b) find that boards are larger and more independent post-SOX, and that these changes drive a large increase in the cost of the board, particularly for small firms. Harvard Law Review (2006) points out that board independence is not a meaningful proxy for the skills needed to monitor managers because it says little about whether the director knows how to distinguish between wise and questionable business decisions.
Our paper contributes to the above literature by explicitly analyzing the degree of information asymmetry between firm executives and independent board members and by taking into account the endogeneity of board composition. By documenting that information asymmetry rises after the SOX mainly for firms that previously have an insider-controlled board, we provide evidence in support that board composition is endogenous.
Our paper is also related to Ravina and Sapienza (2007) , who investigate whether independent directors have enough information to monitor the company's executives by analyzing their trading behavior in the company's stock. Over the sample period of 1986-2003, they show that the difference between the returns earned by firm's executives and independent directors is relatively small at most of the horizons analyzed. Instead, we study the effect of board independence on information environment within corporate board by taking into account the potential endogeneity of board structure. We show that while information asymmetry between corporate executives and independent directors is negligible before the SOX for firms whose boards are previously dominated by insiders, it becomes significant after the SOX.
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
Proxies for Information Asymmetry among Officers and Independent Directors
We classify an individual who is involved with open market purchases over the sample period as an independent director (i.e., an outsider) if he or she has no business or family ties to the firm or the executives, nor owns large blocks of the company stock. An individual is classified as an officer if he or she holds positions in the company. 3 To avoid selection bias, we focus on the existing independent directors -those who have been serving on the board before the SOX -in our main analysis. We then explicitly compare the degree of inside information possessed by the existing independent directors and by the independent directors who come on the board only during the post-SOX period.
We classify an independent director as an "existing" director if he or she has submitted trades during both the pre-and post-SOX periods. An independent director is classified as a "new" director if he or she only initiated trades during the post-SOX period. While the latter proxy is noisy, as will become clear later, they work against finding differences between existing and new independent directors.
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Similarly to Ravina and Sapienza (2007) and independent directors, respectively. The difference in returns then serves as the magnitude of information asymmetry between managers and independent board members.
Proxies for Board Independence
We follow the literature and construct the proxy for board independence by calculating the fraction of the board members as independent directors. In our main analysis, we classify each sample firm as a firm associated with an insider-dominated board or with an outsiderdominated board if the fraction of its board's independent directors in the pre-SOX year 1999 is directors who own more than 10% of the equity but are not related to the officers. As pointed out by Ravina and Sapienza (2007) , since it is possible that some large blockholders are misclassified as independent directors, excluding these blockholders also helps to alleviate the potential issue of misclassification on the returns to the independent directors. 4 In the robustness analysis, we use the IRRC classification to identify whether an individual is a new board member joining the firm post-SOX. Our findings are similar. 5 Using capitalization-based decile return alleviates the impact of size on returns. Our results are robust to alternative measures of market returns, including CRSP value-weighted and S&P 500 returns.
below or above the median fraction of independent directors for the entire IRRC sample in the same year. This classification helps alleviate sample selection bias.
A firm with an insider-dominated board has a majority of inside directors, and hence a low level of board independence, before the SOX. It is more likely to be affected by the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates. On the other hand, a firm with an outsiderdominated board has a majority of outside independent directors, and hence a high level of board independence, before the SOX. It is less likely to be affected by the SOX and the related mandates.
In an alternative setting, we classify each sample firm based on the tercile level of board independence for the entire IRRC sample. Firms falling into the top tercile fraction of independent directors have a larger outsider presence, and therefore a higher level of board independence, than those falling into the middle and bottom tercile fractions. Consequently, they are less affected by the SOX than those with middle and bottom tercile levels of board independence.
Empirical Methodology
We address the potential endogeneity of board composition in the following two ways.
First, we control for firm fixed-effects in the estimations, which will address the type of endogeneity that may arise if both returns and board independence are driven by unobservable time-invariant firm-specific factors. Second, we use an exogenous shock to board structure, which is not directly related to the returns to the board members, to identify a shift in the degree of board independence. Specifically, we investigate whether information asymmetry between firm officers and existing independent board members responds to a shift in board structure following the SOX and the related mandates.
We estimate the following regression model with firm fixed-effects:
where RET t+n is the abnormal buy-and-hold return based on the open market purchase of a firm's stock by its officers and independent directors at time t, against CRSP capitalization-based decile return, over investment horizon n. We vary n with 21, 63, 126, 189, and 252 trading days, corresponding to one, three, six, nine, and 12 months, respectively.
In this regression framework, our primary independent variables include D officer , a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is initiated by one of the firm's officers, and 0 if it is by the existing independent directors, D SOX , a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year in which the transaction takes place belongs to the post-SOX period, and 0 otherwise, and D officer ×D SOX , the interaction term between the two dummy variables.
The coefficient β 1 associated with the dummy variable D officer captures the difference in the buy and hold returns between officers and independent directors during the pre-SOX period, which, if positive (negative), indicates that officers earn higher (lower) returns than independent directors. Post-SOX, the difference in returns is captured by β 1 + β 3 . Hence, the coefficient β 3 associated with the interaction term measures how information asymmetry between the two types of individuals varies over our sample period. Specifically, a positive β 3 suggests an increase in information asymmetry from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX period, and a negative β 3 indicates a decrease in information asymmetry. In addition to controlling for firm fixed-effects in the estimation, vector t Ω contains other individual and firm-specific characteristics that potentially influence the returns. These factors include earnings volatility, firm's future growth opportunities proxied by book to market ratios, previous period return, market transaction conditions proxied by shares turnover. To control for the impact of individual's wealth at stake for their trades to reflect the information, we include individual holdings of the company stock. We also control for firm size by including the log value of a firm's assets in the year prior to the trade. To estimate information asymmetry between firm executives and independent board members, we require a sample firm to have both board director information from the IRRC database and insider trading information from the TFN database. We then obtain the identities of the individuals -corporate officers or independent directors -from the IRRC database.
Our final sample contains 948 firms with 5,193 open market purchase transactions from officers and 5,504 from existing independent directors during the pre-SOX period, as well as 1,989 transactions from managers, 2,910 from existing independent directors and 591 from new independent directors during the post-SOX period.
Firm characteristics are from COMPUSTAT, firm-specific and market return information is from CRSP, governance information is from the IRRC database, and individual's holding data is from TFN's insider filing database.
Comparability of Our Sample and the IRRC Sample
Since by construction, our sample contains only firms whose board members trade their stocks during our sample period, it is important to examine whether our sample firms are representative of the general publicly-traded firms. We start by comparing the board characteristic between the overall IRRC sample and our sample. Table 1 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the board size and the fraction of board members being independent directors between the two samples during both the pre-and post-SOX periods.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that there is no statistical nor economic significance in the fraction of independent directors on the board between the IRRC sample and our sample, regardless whether we compare the two pre-SOX or post-SOX, and whether we compare the two based on firms with insider-dominated boards (Panel B) or outsider-dominated boards (Panel C).
The size of the board, however, is slightly higher in our sample than in the overall IRRC sample.
Panel C of Table 1 reveals that this is more likely for the outsider-dominated board sub-sample during the pre-SOX period.
Table 1 thus suggests that the level of board independence is similar between our sample firms and the overall IRRC sample firms. In addition, firms in our insider-dominated board subsample have the same board size, while firms in our outsider-dominated board sub-sample have slightly larger board than those in the corresponding IRRC sub-sample during the pre-SOX period. Table 2 reports the summary statistics between firms previously associated with insiderdominated boards and those with outsider-dominated boards, during the pre-SOX (Panel A) and post-SOX periods (Panel B). We observe that firms associated with insider-dominated boards have smaller asset base ($6,384 million vs. $11,861 million pre-SOX, and $9,785 million vs.
Summary Statistics
$22,518 million post-SOX, respectively). They tend to have smaller market capitalization and higher book to market ratio, though the differences are not statistically significant during either the pre-or post-SOX periods. Table 2 also compares the overall corporate governance level between the two groups of firms using various versions of the Governance Index (G-index), constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) provide cross-sectional evidence that firm value is higher when shareholder rights are stronger (i.e., when the G-index is lower).
Interestingly, Table 2 shows that the average G-index value is lower for firms with insiderdominated boards, regardless whether G index is based on 24 provisions, 6 provisions, or on classified boards only. 9 The difference in various specifications of G-index between the two groups of firms is statistically significant during both the pre-and post-SOX periods. This indicates that firms with insider-dominated boards on average have significantly better external corporate governance environment than those with outsider-dominated boards. The difference diminishes once we consider median instead of mean value, especially for the most directly relevant measure -classified board. Nevertheless, the univariate comparison in Table 2 suggests that firms previously associated with an insider-dominated board are at least equally, if not better, governed firms as those whose boards had a higher level of board independence before the SOX.
Although not tabulated, 60% of individuals in our sample trade once during the pre-SOX period, 20% trade twice. Post SOX, 65% of individuals trade once, and 17% individuals trade twice. Overall, 95% of individuals within our sample trade less than five times. Table 3 compares the trading frequencies between mangers and existing independent directors. We observe that the majority of the individuals trade once during our sample period, regardless whether it is managers or independent directors, and whether it is the overall sample, or the two subsamples. For example, during the pre-SOX period 62% of officers and 62% of independent directors trade once. In addition, there appears to be no significant difference in terms of trading frequencies between officers and independent directors. Therefore, our subsequent regression results are unlikely driven by dramatically different trading patterns between officers and independent directors, and between the two subsamples.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin our analysis by illustrating the difference in returns earned by firm executives and independent directors without taking into account other individual or firm-specific factors that can influence the returns (sub-section 5.1). In sub-section 5.2, we explicitly analyze the 9 Gompers, Isshii, and Metrick (2003) constructed a G-index based on 24 different provisions. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) find that six of the 24 provisions are most effective: classified boards, limits to bylaw amendments, limits to charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills, and golden parachutes. In particular, classified boards prevent shareholders from replacing a majority of the board of directors without the passage of at least two annual elections. As a result, classified boards make it harder to gain control of a company in either a stand-alone proxy contest or a hostile takeover. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) show that classified boards bring about a reduced firm value.
marginal impact of board structure on the degree of information asymmetry in a multivariate regression framework. We then examine the change in information asymmetry among board members using an alternative specification of board independence in sub-section 5.3. Table 4 reports the average abnormal buy-and-hold returns for officers and independent directors respectively, over various investment horizons (one, three, six, nine, and 12 months).
Mean Analysis
Panel A presents the results for the overall sample. Panels B and C of Table 4 report the results for insider-dominated board and outsider-dominated board sub-samples respectively.
We observe from Panel A that officers consistently earn higher returns than the existing independent directors from their purchase of the firms' shares for all investment horizons, during both pre-and post-SOX periods. For example, one-month holding period return to officers during the pre-SOX period averages 2.32%, 1.38% higher than the return earned by independent directors. The difference in the average buy-and-hold returns between these two types of individuals increases as investment horizon extends, reaching 4.90% for the 12-month (252 trading days) period.
Panel A also reveals that there is a general reduction in information asymmetry, as the difference in the average buy-and-hold returns between officers and independent directors mostly decreases post-SOX. Nevertheless, officers continue to earn higher returns than independent directors, despite the efforts of the SOX and its related mandates that aim to promote disclosure and reduce information asymmetry.
For the insider-dominated board sub-sample (Panel B), the overall sample findings for the pre-SOX period diminish as investment horizon rises -officers no longer significantly outperform independent directors once investment horizon exceeds three months. In contrast, the overall sample findings for the post-SOX period magnify. For example, the difference in the sixmonth (126 trading days) buy-and-hold returns between officers and independent directors averages 6.96% for the insider-dominated board sub-sample, nearly twice the size of 3.81% for the overall sample. The gap in returns between the two widens because post-SOX, the average abnormal buy-and-hold return increases far more for officers than for independent directors.
We observe the opposite for the outsider-dominated board sub-sample in Panel C.
Officers consistently and significantly outperform independent directors only during the pre-SOX period. In fact, there is no statistical or economic difference in returns between the two types of individuals post SOX, suggesting that information asymmetry diminishes after the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates.
To summarize, we find managers appear to possess information advantage over outside directors, as they consistently earn higher abnormal returns than the existing independent
directors from their open market purchase of the firm shares. In addition, the enactments of the SOX and the related mandates have opposite effect depending whether or not a firm previously has an insider-dominated board: Post-SOX, information asymmetry between officers and existing independent directors increases for firms whose boards are previously dominated by insiders, but decreases for firms whose boards are previously dominated by outsiders.
Multivariate Analysis
In this sub-section, we explicitly examine the change in information environment within corporate board using the regression framework discussed in Section 3. Table 5 reports the results for the overall sample (Panel A), insider-dominated board sub-sample (Panel B), and outsider-dominated board sub-sample (Panel C). Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects a series of legal attempts to improve corporate governance and information environment, we should expect a decline in information asymmetry within corporate board after the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates.
We observe from Panel A that controlling for firm fixed-effects and other individual and firm-specific characteristics, the coefficient associated with D officer is positive and significant over all investment horizons. This suggests that pre-SOX, officers earn significantly higher returns than existing independent directors. Post-SOX, the difference in returns between officers and existing independent directors is captured by
yields a p value of 0.178, 0.036, 0.002, 0.002, and 0.056, for one-, three-, six-, nine-, and 12-month period, respectively, suggesting that officers continue to earn significantly higher returns than independent board members except for the one-month holding period. Furthermore, we observe that there is no change in information asymmetry from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX period, as the coefficient associated with the interaction term remains insignificant for all investment horizons. These results indicate that the implementations of the SOX and the related mandates do not lead to an overall improvement in information environment for our sample firms.
For firms previously associated with an insider-dominated board, we find from Panel B that, contrary to the results for the overall sample, the difference in returns between officers and independent directors -captured by the coefficient associated with D officer -is insignificant for returns over the holding periods of three, six, nine, and 12 months, and is only marginally significant for the one-month period. Our result thus indicates that during the pre-SOX period, information asymmetry between firm executives and independent board members is at most marginal for firms with an insider-controlled board. This evidence is consistent with the literature arguing that an insider-dominated board better exploits insider information.
While officers do not earn significantly different returns than independent directors before the SOX, they do so after the SOX. A joint test for 0
yields a pvalue of 0.068, 0.000, 0.000, and 0.003 for three-, six-, nine-and 12-month periods, respectively.
This suggests that controlling for firm fixed-effects and other individual and firm-specific characteristics, officers earn significantly higher buy-and hold returns than independent directors for investment horizons exceeding one-month holding period during the post-SOX period. To summarize, our multivariate results indicate that the implementations of the SOX and the related mandates alleviate the information asymmetry between firm executives and independent directors only for firms that have already had a strong outsider presence in their boards, as the difference in abnormal buy-and-hold returns between officers and independent directors diminishes post-SOX. Instead, for firms that previously have a strong insider presence in their boards, information environment becomes even more opaque, as the difference in abnormal returns between officers and independent directors amplifies post-SOX.
Alternative Specification of Board Independence: Tercile Analysis
In the previous sub-section we document an increased information asymmetry among board members after the SOX for firms whose board was controlled by insiders. We postulate that for a higher level of insider presence in the board before the SOX, the increase in information asymmetry is more prominent. To examine the effect of board structure on information asymmetry as the level of board independence rises, we re-classify each sample firm as a firm with a Low, Intermediate, or High level of board independence if the fraction of its board's independent directors falls within the bottom, middle or top tercile of the fraction of independent directors for the entire IRRC sample during the pre-SOX period.
We re-estimate our regression and report the results in Table 6 . For brevity, control variables and firm fixed-effects are included in the multivariate analyses but are not reported.
For firms that fall to the bottom tercile level of board independence, the presence of outside director presence is low before the SOX. Similar to the results reported in Table 5 , we find from Panel A that pre-SOX, officers earn similar return than existing independent directors. Post-SOX, they earn significantly higher returns than existing independent directors for investment horizons beyond one-month (21 trading days) period. The interaction term also becomes significantly positive, suggesting an increase in information asymmetry from pre-SOX to post-SOX.
For firms whose fraction of independent directors falls to the top tercile level of the IRRC sample, the presence of outside directors is high before the SOX. We observe the opposite from Panel C: Managers do not outperform existing independent directors post-SOX. In addition, the interaction term is negative and significant, suggesting a decrease in information asymmetry between managers and independent directors from pre-SOX to post-SOX.
Our findings therefore are consistent with the results documented in Table 5 . The increase in information asymmetry is most severe for firms with lowest tercile of board independence, whereas the decrease in information asymmetry is mostly concentrated among firms with highest tercile level of board independence.
POST-SOX ANALYSIS
In the previous section we examine how information asymmetry within corporate board varies from pre-SOX to post-SOX periods. We now concentrate on the post-SOX period. In subsection 6.1, we extend our analysis to incorporate outside directors that serve on the board of our sample firms only during the post-SOX period. In subsection 6.2, we compare the information asymmetry between firms that have experienced a significant shift in board independence and those that continue to maintain an insider-controlled board even after the SOX.
Independent Directors On Board Post-SOX
In our main analysis, we mitigate the potential selection bias by excluding transactions initiated by independent directors who are only present at the corporate board after the SOX.
Instead, we concentrate on the returns and purchase activities from the existing independent directors who have been serving on the corporate board before the SOX.
In this sub-section, we extend our analysis to the information asymmetry between officers and the outside directors who join the board after the SOX. We poise that due to the relatively short time horizon, outsider directors who begin to sit on the board after the SOX are on average less familiar with the firm's business and operations compared to existing independent directors. Subsequently, they should experience similar or even a greater degree of information disadvantage with respect to management. A direct implication is that existing independent directors earn higher returns than independent directors appointed post-SOX. In addition, this information asymmetry is likely to be more severe for firms that are previously associated with an insider-dominated board.
We classify a transaction as a trade from a newly appointed outside director if he or she has not initiated any trade on the company's shares before the SOX within the TFN Insider Filing Database. While this proxy is noisy because it is possible to include independent directors who have been present on the board pre-SOX but have only initiated trades post-SOX, the potential classification error works against us finding a difference in information asymmetry between existing and newly appointed independent directors during the post-SOX period. We identify and include 591 trades initiated by new independent directors for our sample firms.
We investigate whether newly appointed independent directors earn lower returns than existing independent directors using a sub-sample that contains the trades initiated only by independent directors over the post-SOX period. We regress the abnormal returns against a dummy variable D new_dir , equal to one if a trade is conducted by a new independent director, and zero otherwise. We also include firm fixed-effect and the same set of control variables Ω t as in our main analysis, which contains earnings volatility, previous return, shares turnover, market to book ratio, firm size, and individual holdings of the company stock.
We run the following regression with firm fixed-effects for the insider-dominated board sub-sample and the outsider-dominated board sub-sample, respectively, for the post-SOX period:
where n varies from 21, 63, 126, 189, to 252 trading days. In this regression framework, the coefficient associated with the dummy variable D new_dir captures the difference in returns between the existing and newly appointed independent directors. Panel A Table 7 reports the regression results for firms previously associated with an insider-controlled board. For brevity, control variables are included in the multivariate analyses but are not reported.
We observe that the coefficient for the new director dummy D new_dir is negative over all investment horizons, and is statistically significant over the buy-and-hold periods of 21, 63, 126 and 189 trading days. This suggests that, controlling for firm fixed-effects and other individual and firm characteristics that can potentially affect a director's open market purchases of the firm's shares, new independent directors coming on the board during the post-SOX period on average earn lower returns than the existing independent directors most of the time.
Tables 4 and 5 have shown that officers of firms previously associated with an insidercontrolled board earn significantly higher returns than existing independent directors during the post-SOX period. Table 7 hence indicates that compared to existing directors, newly appointed independent directors are at even greater information disadvantage with respect to officers.
Together, these results suggest that for firms that previously had an insider-dominated board, enforcing a higher level of board independence by installing more independent directors does not alleviate the information asymmetry between officers and existing independent directors. Instead, the deterioration of information environment inside the existing corporate board spills over to the newly appointed independent directors. Since firms with the lowest level of board independence pre-SOX are more likely to add highest number of outside directors post-SOX, the spill-over effect can be even more severe.
In contrast, for firms previously associated with an outsider-dominated board, there is no difference in returns between existing and new independent directors. As indicated by Panel B of Table 7 , the coefficient for D new_dir is neither statistically nor economically significant for all investment horizons. This suggests that controlling for firm fixed-effects and other individual and firm characteristics, existing independent directors in firms with an outsider-controlled board do not possess significant information advantage than new independent directors.
Although untabulated, the difference in coefficient associated with D new_dir between the insider-dominated board sub-sample and the outsider-dominated board sub-sample is negative over all investment horizons, and is statistically significant for the buy-and-hold periods of 21, 63, and 126 days. This suggests that the difference in returns between an existing and a newly appointed independent director on average is higher for firms whose boards were previously dominated by insiders than for those whose boards were previously dominated by outsiders. This is consistent with our conjecture that information asymmetry is likely to be more severe for firms that are previously associated with an insider-dominated board.
Change in the Degree of Board Independence
In this sub-section we investigate how information asymmetry varies with the change in the degree of board independence from a different perspective. In our sample, 156 firms have less than 50% independent directors in their corporate board before the SOX. Post-SOX, 125 of them raise the fraction of independent directors above 50%, whereas 31 of them remain below the 50% threshold level. We postulate that information asymmetry rises among firms whose level of outsider presence in the board increases significantly as a consequence of the SOX and its related mandates, whereas information asymmetry remains unchanged if a firm does not significantly alter its degree of board independence.
We estimate the following regression model for the post-SOX period: To mitigate the impact of outliers on small sample, we estimate the above model using robust regression and median regression, respectively. Our variables of interest are D officer , D above50% (a dummy equal to 1 if the fraction of independent directors exceeds the 50% threshold imposed by the SOX and the related mandates), and the interaction term of the two variables. In this setting, 1 α captures the difference in returns earned by executives and existing independent directors for firms that maintain a below-threshold level of board independence. shift their board independence from the below 50% to the above 50% threshold usually earn significantly higher return than existing independent directors.
DOES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY OF CORPORATE BOARD MATTER?
In the previous section we provide evidence that board composition is likely to be endogenous, as enforcing a change in board independence -such as the implementations of SOX and the related mandates -leads an increase in information asymmetry for firms whose boards were dominated by insiders. Since board decisions are based on the information available to its members, a deteriorating interaction between insiders and outsiders may adversely affect the efficiency of board monitoring. In this section we investigate whether information asymmetry between firm executives and independent directors affects the firm's real performance.
Since our study examines the abnormal returns earned by board members and officers through their open market trades of firms' shares, the research design precludes us from using any market-based performance measures such as Tobin's Q and stock returns. Instead, we concentrate on firm's operating performance. We first construct three performance measures:
industry-adjusted ROA, operating income and free cash flows, where industry classification is based on 3-digit SIC codes. ROA is defined as annual income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets, operating income is defined as annual income before depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets, and free cash flows are defined as annual operating income before depreciation and amortization minus capital expenditure and then scaled by total assets.
We then estimate the following regression model:
where D insider is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has an insider-dominated board in 1999 and 0 otherwise, and t Φ contains firm-specific control variables including size, age, leverage, board size, and degree of board independence.
10 Table 9 reports the regression results for all three industry-adjusted performance measures. We observe that the coefficient for the dummy variable D insider is insignificant regardless of the performance measure being used. This suggests that during the pre-SOX period, there is no difference in operating performance between firms with insider-controlled boards and those with outsider-controlled boards.
In contrast, the sum of the coefficients for D insider and for the interaction term is negative, and the F-test for 0
yields p-values of 0.002 or less for all three 10 Firm size is the log of market value of equity (in million dollars) at the end of each sample year. To avoid spurious relation we do not use log of assets as a proxy for size because both ROA and operating income are scaled by total assets. Firm age is calculated as the number of years since the firm's first appearance on COMPUSTAT with valid data on asset. Leverage is defined as current debt plus long-term debt, divided by book value of assets. Board size is the total number of directors. Board independence is the fraction of board numbers as independent directors.
industry-adjusted performance measures. This suggests that during the post-SOX period, firms that are previously associated with an insider-controlled board experience significantly worse operating performance than those previously with an outsider-controlled board. In addition, the coefficient for
is significant, confirming that the difference in operating performance between the two types of firms changes significantly from pre-SOX to post-SOX.
Results from Table 9 hence indicate that while both types of firms have similar operating performance during the pre-SOX period, it is the firms experiencing a significant increase in information asymmetry within corporate board that face a deteriorating performance post-SOX.
Our findings are consistent with these of Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2008) , who document firms with a higher cost of information acquisition experiencing worse performance post-SOX.
ROBUSTNESS
Alternative Sample Specifications
In our main analyses, we partition our sample into sub-samples of insider-and outsiderdominated boards according to the median level of board independence of the IRRC database.
Since this proxy is constructed based on firms included in the IRRC database, using the median value of the board independence proxy of the IRRC sample instead of our sample alleviates potential sample selection bias. As a robustness check, we re-estimate Tables 4 through 7 using the mean level of board independence of the IRRC sample and of our sample, respectively. Our findings remain unchanged.
To mitigate other regulatory events that may concur during our sample period, in another robustness check we restrict our pre-SOX period to 1998 -1999 , and post-SOX period to 2003 and re-estimate Tables 4 through 7. We find similar results.
Alternative Variable Specifications
To check the robustness of our result, in untabulated regressions, we also include year fixed-effects in order to address selection based on time-varying unobservable factors. Adding firm fixed-effect absorbs all the cross-sectional variations and allows us to examine time-series variation separately. By controlling for year fixed-effect in addition to firm fixed effect, all the time-series variations in abnormal holding-period returns come from the difference between the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. The results are similar.
To check the robustness of our findings to alternative regression specification, we also reestimate Tables 4 through 7 using additional control variables -such as board size, a dummy for the stock exchange where the firm is traded, industry dummy, an interaction between board size and the SOX dummy, and bubble dummy -instead of firm fixed-effects. Our results do not change.
In another robustness check, we replace the holding variable with the natural log of holding, the fraction of shares held by directors and managers, and with the size of the transaction, respectively. Instead of earnings volatility, we replace with cash flow volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of cash flow over the 3 years prior to each insider transaction.
Our results are robust.
To ensure the conservativeness of our analysis on new independent directors on board during the post-SOX period, we classify an independent director as a new board member if he or she does not initiate trades during the pre-SOX period. As a robustness check, we merge the identity of board director from the IRRC database with insider trading sample, and use the IRRC classification for new board members. We re-estimate the results of Tables 4 through 7, and our findings are robust.
Effect of Corporate Governance: G-Index
Board independence is often considered as a key ingredient of a firm's internal corporate governance system. If the fraction of independent directors in the board is correlated with governance characteristics, then it is possible that our results that information asymmetry deteriorates for firms previously associated with a low level of board independence are in fact driven by these firms being poorly governed. Nevertheless, by including a firm fixed-effect in our main analyses, we control for firm-level governance rules.
As a robustness check, we examine whether our results are pertinent to the information environment among board members, or merely reflect the effect of the overall corporate governance system. We use the Governance Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to classify a firm as a high or low G-index firm if its G-index is above or below the median G-index level of our sample. We then re-estimate our results in Table 5 for the low-G sub-sample and high-G sub-sample, respectively, rather than insider-versus outsider-dominated board sub-samples. If our findings are driven by firm's governance characteristics, we should expect to observe similar results based on the G-index classification.
Instead, we find that there is no change in information asymmetry among board members from the pre-SOX to the post-SOX period, regardless whether it is a high-G or a low-G firm, as the coefficient associated with the interaction term
indicates that officers earn statistically indistinguishable returns as existing independent directors post-SOX, for both the high-G and low-G sub-sample firms, and over most investment horizons. The only exception is the investment horizon of 126 trading days for the high-G sub-sample, where the difference in market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns between officers and independent directors becomes marginally significant (p = 0.063).
In an alternative robustness test, we classify each sample firm into one of the two subsamples depending on whether the firm has a large (above the sample median) or small (below the sample median) board during the pre-SOX period. We find that our previous findings are not driven by the board size.
These results suggest that the change in information asymmetry among board members is related to board composition -measured by the degree of board independence -rather than to the overall level of corporate governance or other board characteristics. There seems to be evidence consistent with the argument that board structure is endogenously determined, and that board independence does not necessarily translate to the efficiency of board monitoring.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigate the effect of board structure on the informativeness of independent directors by comparing the returns earned by officers and independent directors from their purchases of the firm's shares. To address the issue of endogeneity, we examine whether an exogenous shock to the corporate board structure -the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the related mandates -leads to a shift in the difference in returns between these two types of individuals.
With the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates aiming at better corporate governance and information environment, we would expect a decrease in information asymmetry between corporate executives and board directors. Instead, we find that for the overall sample, firm executives earn higher abnormal returns than independent directors over various buy-and-hold investment horizons, both before and after the implementation of the SOX and the related mandates.
Further analyses indicate that this result is driven by firms whose boards are previously controlled by insiders. We find no significant difference in returns between officers and independent directors for these firms during the pre-SOX period. However, post-SOX, officers earn significantly higher abnormal buy-and-hold returns than independent directors. Furthermore, enforcing a higher level of board independence by including new independent directors does not improve the existing information environment within the board for these firms. Instead, new independent directors are at even greater information disadvantage relative to firms' officers.
Our results are robust to firm fixed-effects, market trading conditions, time-varying firmspecific factors such as size and growth opportunities, and alternative classification of board independence and governance characteristics. Our paper thus provides evidence in favor of
Raheja (2005), Harris and Raviv (2006) and Adam and Ferreia (2007) that board structure is endogenous, as information asymmetry increases after the SOX for firms whose board previously has less outsider presence. In addition, by documenting that operating performance deteriorates when information asymmetry within corporate broad rises, we provide evidence on the real effect of information asymmetry of corporate board. [2003] [2004] [2005] . Assets are measured as the book value of total assets at the year when the insider transaction is made. Market value of equity is measured as the product of shares outstanding and stock price at the date when the insider transaction is made. Book to market ratio is the ratio between the book value of equity and market value of equity. G Index (24) is obtained from IRRC and measured according to Gompers, Isshii, and Metrick's (2003) 24 different provisions. G index (6) is defined in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) to be six of the 24 provisions including: classified boards, limits to bylaw amendments, limits to charter amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, poison pills, and golden parachutes. Classified board is defined in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) . p-values testing the difference in means between the insider-dominated board sub-sample and the outsider-dominated board sub-sample are based on Satterthwaite standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. (1998) (1999) (2000) and post-SOX (2003 post-SOX ( -2005 periods. Independent directors are individuals who are on the board of our sample firms but do not have any business relationship with the firm. We classify each sample firm as a firm with insider-dominated board or with an outsider-dominated board if the fraction of its board's independent directors is below or above the median fraction of independent directors for the entire IRRC sample during the pre-SOX period. 21, 63, 126, 189 and 252 tradings days (one-, three-, six-, nine-, and 12-month periods) over the sample period. Abnormal return is measured as a buy-and-hold abnormal return since the transaction takes place by taking the difference between the actual daily return and the daily market return, where the market return is the CRSP's NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ daily capitalization-based decile return and compounded over various buy-and-hold periods. The pre-SOX period is 1998-2000. The post-SOX period is [2003] [2004] [2005] . Officers are individuals holding positions in our sample firms. Independent directors are individuals who are on the board of our sample firms but do not have any business relationship with the firm. We classify each sample firm as a firm with insider-dominated board or with an outsider-dominated board if the fraction of its board's independent directors is below or above the median fraction of independent directors for the entire IRRC sample during the pre-SOX period. p-values testing the difference in returns between officers and existing independent directors are based on Satterthwaite standard errors and are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. -, three-, six-, nine-, and 12-month periods (21, 63, 126, 189 , and 252 trading days, respectively) over the sample period. The pre-SOX period is 1998-2000. The post-SOX period is [2003] [2004] [2005] . Abnormal return is measured as a buy-and-hold abnormal return since the transaction takes place by taking the difference between the actual daily return and the daily market return, where the market return is the CRSP's NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ daily capitalization-based decile return and compounded over the different holding periods. We classify each sample firm as a firm with insider-dominated board or with an outsider-dominated board if the fraction of its board's independent directors is below or above the median fraction of independent directors for the entire IRRC sample during the pre-SOX period. D officer is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction is conducted by one of the firm's officers, and zero if it is by independent directors. D SOX is a dummy variable equal to one if the year when the transaction occurs belongs to the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. Earnings volatility is measured as the standard deviation of EPS over the 3 years prior to each insider transaction. Book to market ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value to market value of equity at the time when the insider transaction is made. Previous period return is measured as the firm stock performance of prior one, two, three, six, nine or twelve-month return chosen based on the abnormal return investigated in the regression. Turnover is measured as the average share turnover during the month when the insider trade is made. Firm size is the log of total assets (in million dollars) at the date when the insider transaction is made. Holding is the dollar value of individual holdings (stake) of the company's stock (in million dollars). p-values based on robust errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. This table reports the average market-adjusted buy and hold returns between existing and new independent directors over various investment horizons. Existing independent directors are defined as these who are present on the board before the SOX -in the year of 1999. New independent directors are defined as these who initiated trades only after the SOX. The dummy variable D new_dir equals one if the individual is a new independent director, and zero if is an existing independent director. The same set of control variables as in Table 5 are included in the regression analyses, but are not reported. p-values based on robust errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. (2003) (2004) (2005) , for firms whose fraction of independent directors on board is below 50% before the SOX. Abnormal return is measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal return since the transaction takes place by taking the difference between the actual daily return and the daily market return, where the market return is the CRSP's NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ daily capitalization-based decile return and compounded over the different holding periods. D abvoe50% is a dummy variable equals to one if the fraction of independent directors on board exceeds 50% post-SOX, and zero otherwise. pvalues based on uneven variance are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. This table compares the operating performance over the sample period between firms with an insider-dominated board and those with an outsider-dominated board. For each sample firm, industry-adjusted ROA is calculated as firm's annual income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets, minus industry average, where industry classification is based on the 3 digits SIC codes. Industry-adjusted operating income is defined as annual income before depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets, then minus industry average. Industry-adjusted free cash flow is calculated as operating income before depreciation and amortization minus capital expenditure, scaled by total assets, then minus industry average. D SOX is a dummy variable equal to one if the year belongs to the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. D insider is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is associated with an insider-controlled board in 1999, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the log of market value of equity (in million dollars) at the end of each sample year. Firm age is calculated as the number of years since the firm's first appearance on COMPUSTAT with valid data on asset. Leverage is defined as current debt plus long-term debt, divided by book value of assets. Board size is the total number of directors. Board independence is the fraction of board numbers as independent directors. p-values based on robust errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
